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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
undertakes to do that which is contrary to express public policy engages
in the performance of an unlawful act. 21'
Whenever an interest valuable to society has needed encouragement,
the United States, through its courts and legislative bodies, has developed it;
but as soon as it becomes too strong attempts are made to curtail it. Capital
reached its peak under laissez faire; then the government restricted it. Labor
reached its peak under the New Deal,3 0 now it has been limited. The
writer strongly feels that attempts will be made by the present Administration to find a balance between the conflicting interests of capital and labor.
Norton H. Schwartz
LIENS

-

PRIORITY OF MECHANICS' LIEN OVER TAX LIEN

The United States sought to prevent a materialman from foreclosing
his lien, claiming priority of its tax lien over the prior recorded, unperfected mechanic's lien. Held, the mechanic's lien had priority by the
2
1
court's interpretation of the applicable federal and Florida statutes.
United States v. Griffin-Moore Lumber Co., 62 So.2d 589 (Fla. 1953).
Neglect or refusal by anyone to pay any federal tax after demand
gives a lien to the United States against that person's real and personal
property.3 Originally this lien became operative upon the receipt of a list
of assessments by the collector of internal revenue, 4 and was valid against
other claimants without any necessity for filing notice.5 An amendment
was passed requiring filing of notice for the lien to have validity against
mortgagees,7 judgment creditors, pledgees, and purchasers.9 In its application, this section of the Internal Revenue Code,'0 which grants a pre29. Gazzan v. Building Service Employees International Union, Local 262, 29
Wash.2d 448, 188 P.2d 97 (1947), aff'd 339 U.S. 532 (1950); Roth v. Local Union
No. 1460 of Retail Clerks Union, 216 Ind. 363, 24 N.E.2d 280 (1939).
30. Walter Gordon Merritt, The Truth About Labor Relations, New York: PrenticeHall Inc., 1951, p. 113.
"... Constitutional walls to protect property were razed and Constitutional walls
to protect labor were built on the same site. \Vhere formerly there was a Constitutional
right to obstruct unions, there was substituted a Constitutional right to obstruct business."
1. IN?. REv. CoDE §§ 3670, 3672.
2. FIA. STAT. §§ 84.16. 84.21, 84.23 (1951).
3. [NT. Ri:v. CODE § 3670.
4. 14 STAT. 98 (1866), as amended, INr. RE.v CODE § 3672,
5. United States v. Snyder, 149 U.S. 210 (1893); United States v. Curry, 201

Fed. 371 (D. Md. 191Z).

6. INT. REV. CODE § 3672; Note, 29 N.C.L. REv. 300 (19511.

7. Muhleman and Kayhoe v. Brown, 4 Terry 207, 45 A.2d 521 (Del. Super. Ct.
1945).
8. United States v. Spreckels, 50 F. Supp. 789 (N.D. Cal. 1943); Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Sobel, 175 Misc. 1067, 26 N.Y.S.2d 145 (N.Y. City Ct. 1940).
9. In re Fisher Plastics Corp., 89 F. Supp. 446 (D. Mass. 1950); United States
v. Rosebush, 45 F. Supp. 664 (E.D. \Vis. 1942); Cranford Co. v. Leopold & Co., 189
Misc. 388, 70 N.Y.S.2d 183 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 273 App. Div. 754, 75 N.Y.S.2d 512
(1st Dept. 1947), appeal denied, 273 App. Div. 846, 76 N.Y.S.2d 839, app. dismissed,
297 N.Y. 884, 79 N.E.2d 279, aff'd, 298 N.Y. 676, 82 N.E.2d 580 (1948).
10. INT. REV. CODE § 3672.

CASES NOTED
ferred status to members of the aforementioned category, has been strictly
construed to exempt only those named specifically and no others.1'
Decisions involving application of the federal tax lien have been many
and varied because of the conflicting state laws which come into consideration in many federal tax cases) l2 Two of the most important recent
decisions on the question of priority of federal tax liens are In re Taylor8 and United States v. Security Trust & Savcraft Aviation Corporation1
ings Bank." In the former case, the Circuit Court held that the Ohio
mechanics' lien law' " - very similar to the one in Florida"8 - allowed
the materialman priority over the federal tax claim because (1) it provides for a perfected claim from the time of furnishing labor and/or
materials, and (2) to grant the government's lien priority would result
in unjust enrichment at the expense of the laborer or materialman. In
the latter case, the claimant of an attachment lien had been given priority
over the federal tax lien by the lower court, which claimed the California
statute 17 recognizes an attachment lien as of the day of filing notice,
and that no section of the Internal Revenue Code gives tax liens priority
over prior recorded attachment liens. The United States Supreme Court
unanimously reversed this ruling, asserting the right of the federal government to determine if the private debtor's lien is sufficiently perfected
to take priority over one subsequently recorded by the United States.
The Court further denied the state, without consent of Congress, utilization of the doctrine which relates judugments back to the time of attachment. 18

In the instant case, the court grounds its decision on two main
findings. It first makes issue of fact that Section 3672 of the Internal
Revenue Code does not give the federal tax lien priority over the lien of
a materialman. The court then continues to give a liberal interpretation
of the mechanics' lien law in Florida' 9 and its connection with the theory
11. Miller v. Bank of America, 166 F.2d 415 (9th Cir. 1948); MacKenzie v.
United States, 109 F.2d 540 (9th Cir. 1940); United States v. Fisher, 93 F. Supp. 73
(N.D. Cal. 1948); see United States v. Security Trust & Savings Bank, 340 U.S. 47,
51 (1950)

(concurring opinion).

12. Springer Land Ass'n v. Ford, 168 U.S. 513 (1897); In re Taylorcraft Aviation
Corp., 168 F.2d 808 (6th Cir. 1948); In re Capital Foundry Corp., 64 F. Snpp. 885
(E.D. N.Y. 1946); Winther v. Morrison, 93 Cal.2d 608, 209 P.2d 657 (D.C. App.
4th D. 1949), cert. granted, 339 U.S. 947, rev'd sub nom. United States v. Security
Trust & Savings Bank, 340 U.S. 47 (1950); Louisiana State University v. Hart.
210 La. 78, 26 So.2d 361 (1946).
13. In re Taylorcraft Aviation Corp. 168 F.Zd 808 (6th Cir. 1948).
14. United States v. Security Trust & Savings Bank, 340 U.S. 47 (1950).
15. Ouo GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 8310, 8314, 8321 (1952).
16. FIA. STAT. C. 84 (1951)
17. CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. §§ 537, 542a (1949).
18. United States v. Security 'rust & Savings Bank, 340 U.S. 47, 53 (1950)
(Mr. I. Jackson in concurring opinion, "'My conclusion from this history [of past

litigation and legislation on tax lien priorities) is that the statute excludes from the
provisions of this secret lien those types of interests which it specifically included in

the statute and no others.")
19. FLA. STAT. C. 84 (1951).
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of unjust enrichment. It is also interesting to note that In re Taylorcraft
Aviation Corporation is cited as being a case involving a similar
mechanics' lien law, reaching substantially the same conclusion as did
the Florida Supreme Court. There was, however, no mention of United
States v. Security Trust & Savings Bank" except as a citation to Section
3672 of the United States Code.
The court, in deciding the principal case, has sought to give the
materialman every conceivable advantage because of its philosophical
approach to the problems of unjust enrichment and the necessity of the
laborer and materialmen being rewarded for their efforts. Nevertheless,
we are forced to decide legal questions, not alone according to the dictates
of our consciences, but also with great regard for the written laws which
have been the cause of the dispute and which should be the guide to its
final resolution.
For this reason it is important to recognize that although the court
used a substantial number of decisions to support its conclusion, all of
these cases were in state and lower federal courts, and every one of them
22
preceded the decision in Unitd States v. Security Trust & Savings Bank.
From the logic which the highest court in the land used in that decision,
we may reasonably anticipate that a new trend may have been initiated
to give the federal tax lien somewhat greater strength in similar future
cases.
Murray D. Shear

SURETY-EFFECT OF PREMATURE PAYMENTS ON
SURETY BOND
In a suit for indemnification by the owner (obligee), the contractor's
surety pleaded that the owner's premature payments were a material deviation from the contract, and constituted a discharge. The trial court awarded
summary judgment to the defendant surety. Held, a compensated surety
is discharged only when the owner's deviation from the contract results in
injury to the surety, and the discharge is limited to the extent of such
injury. The fact of the alleged deviation and its extent is a question for the
jury and precludes an award of summary judgment. Gibbs v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 62 So.2d 599 (Fla. 1952).
Prior to the advent of the corporate surety late in the nineteenth century, sureties enjoyed a favored position in the eyes of the law,' and the
law of suretyship was characterized by the rule of strictissimi juris.2 But the
20. In re Tavlorcraft Aviation Corp., 168 F.2d 808 (6th Cir. 1948).
21. United States v. Security Trust & Savings Bank, 340 U.S. 47 (1950).
22. Ibid.

1. Note, 15 IowA L. REv. 470 (1930).
2. United States v. Free], 92 Fed. 299, (C.C. E.D. N.Y. 1899), aff'd, 99 Fed, 237

